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Abstract
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In
the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader’s
incomplete knowledge about the follower’s payoffs, typically by gathering information from the
leader’s interaction with the follower. Unfortunately, these approaches rely crucially on the assump-
tion that the follower will not strategically exploit this information asymmetry, i.e., the follower
behaves truthfully during the interaction according to their actual payoffs. As we show in this paper,
the follower may have strong incentives to deceitfully imitate the behavior of a different follower
type and, in doing this, benefit significantly from inducing the leader into choosing a highly subop-
timal strategy. This raises a fundamental question: how to design a leader strategy in the presence of
a deceitful follower? To answer this question, we put forward a basic model of Stackelberg games
with (imitative) follower deception and show that the leader is indeed able to reduce the loss due to
follower deception with carefully designed policies. We then provide a systematic study of the prob-
lem of computing the optimal leader policy and draw a relatively complete picture of the complexity
landscape; essentially matching positive and negative complexity results are provided for natural
variants of the model. Our intractability results are in sharp contrast to the situation with no decep-
tion, where the leader’s optimal strategy can be computed in polynomial time, and thus illustrate the
intrinsic difficulty of handling follower deception. Through simulations we also examine the benefit
of considering follower deception in randomly generated games.
1 Introduction
Recently, there is a growth of interest in Stackelberg games in the AI community. This trend is driven
in part by a number of high-impact real-world applications in security domains [Tambe, 2011]. Be-
yond that, Stackelberg game models also find many noteworthy applications in other problems, such
as principal-agent contract design [Page, 1991; Van Long and Sorger, 2010] and exam design for large-
scale tests [Li and Conitzer, 2017]. In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a mixed strategy and
a follower best-responds after observing the leader’s strategy. The Stackelberg equilibrium yields the
optimal strategy the leader can commit to in this framework. As in many other game-theoretic ap-
plications, a key real-world challenge facing applications of Stackelberg games is that the leader may
not have full information about the follower’s payoffs for computing the equilibrium. To address this
issue, various approaches have been proposed: When the leader can estimate the follower’s payoffs to
∗Jiarui Gan was supported by the EPSRC International Doctoral Scholars Grant EP/N509711/1. Zinovi Rabinovich’s
contribution to this paper was supported by NTU SUG M4081985 grant.
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within certain intervals, leader strategies that are robust against small interval uncertainties are computed
[Letchford et al., 2009; Kiekintveld et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2014]; When the leader knows a distri-
bution about the follower’s payoffs/types, Bayesian Stackelberg equilibria are studied to maximize the
leader’s average utility [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006; Paruchuri et al., 2008; Jain et al., 2008]; When
the leader can interact with the follower, algorithms are designed to learn the optimal leader strategy
to commit to from the follower’s best responses in the interaction [Letchford et al., 2009; Blum et al.,
2014; Haghtalab et al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2019].
Despite their differences, the above approaches share a common and crucial step — obtaining
payoff-relevant information about the follower. However, knowing the leader’s attempt at information
gathering, a strategic follower would be incentivized to intentionally distort information learned by the
leader, in particular by deceitfully imitating the behavior of a different follower type — a phenomenon
we term imitative follower deception. Unfortunately, all aforementioned approaches ignore the possibil-
ity of a deceitful follower and adopt a simplistic assumption that any follower information the algorithm
gathers is truthful.
As we will show in this paper, algorithms designed under the above assumption can be easily ma-
nipulated by the follower and may produce highly suboptimal leader strategies as a result. Consider
perhaps the most basic learning setting where the follower has an uncertain type (i.e., a full set of payoff
parameters) θ ∈ Θ. Knowing the set Θ of all possible types but not the actual θ, the leader wants to
learn the optimal strategy against this follower. If the follower is truthful, the optimal strategy the leader
can learn would be the strong Stackelberg equilibrium. However, if the follower behaves completely
according to the payoff parameters of another type θ′ (he may indeed have such an incentive, as we
will show), the leader can only learn the optimal strategy against the fake type θ′, which may be highly
suboptimal. A fundamental question then is: what is the optimal strategy the leader can learn or design
when facing a deceitful follower?
In this paper, we put forward a basic Stackelberg model in an attempt to formalize this question
and aim to understand how imitative follower deception affects the leader’s choice of strategies. We
note that, even though there might be other forms of follower deception as well, imitative deception is
arguably the simplest and the most natural deception approach, which we expect to happen the most
often in practice. Our model is Bayesian by nature: the type of the follower is drawn from a finite set Θ;
the follower knows his true type, but the leader only has a probabilistic belief about it. To play against
a deceitful follower, the leader commits to a policy — a “menu” that specifies a mixed strategy to play
for each (learned) follower type. Knowing the leader’s commitment, a follower of true type θ ∈ Θ can
imitate another type θ′ ∈ Θ, behaving consistently according to the payoffs of θ′ to mislead the leader
into learning the fake type θ′. The leader then plays the strategy specified by the committed policy for
θ′. The optimal leader policy maximizes the leader’s expected utility, taking into account the follower’s
optimal imitating strategy in the loop; this is precisely the optimal leader strategy that can be learned in
the deceptive setting.
1.1 Our Contribution
We make the following contribution. In Section 2, we provide a motivating example to illustrate the
mechanisms of imitative follower deception, the loss it brings to the leader, and how the leader can
reduce the loss with carefully designed strategies. Then, we formalize the model in Section 3.
In Section 4, we study the hardness of handling follower deception and draw a relatively complete
picture of the problem’s complexity landscape. We consider settings both with and without incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints; the former requires the leader strategy to incentivize the follower to report
his true type while the latter does not. On the negative side, we show that it is hard even to approximate
the optimal leader policy within any meaningful ratio unless P = NP, with or without IC constraints;
the ratios are also shown to be tight. The results indicate that deception is the fundamental reason of
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the intractability as, when there is no deception, the problem can be solved in polynomial time simply
by computing the optimal commitment for each follower type separately. Despite the computational
barriers, we provide an MILP (mixed integer linear program) formulation as a practical approach to
compute the optimal leader policy, from which a fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the number
of follower types can be derived.
In Section 5, we further observe that the leader can improve her utility using a mixed policy, that
samples from a distribution a strategy to play for each follower type. We study the respective compu-
tational problems above with mixed policies and find that, in addition to the utility improvement they
bring, the optimal mixed policy can be computed in polynomial time when IC constraints are imposed;
though, the problem remains hard to approximate without IC.
In Section 6, through simulations, we compare the improvement of leader utility by our approaches
and other benchmark approaches in randomly generated games, and examine the benefit of considering
follower deception. We conclude in Section 7 with a short discussion on future directions of this work.
1.2 Additional Applications and Related Work
Besides furthering our understanding about the best leader strategy that can be learned when facing
a deceitful follower, our model can also be applied directly to a number of applications. For exam-
ple, in principal-agent contract design (a widely studied Stackelberg model in economics [Page, 1991;
Van Long and Sorger, 2010; con, 2017]), a principal may present a menu of contracts to an uncertain
agent and ask the agent to choose one that matches his true type. Naturally, the principal’s menu must
take into account the agent’s misreport of his type. Similar ideas apply to exam design for large-scale
tests, e.g., for MOOCs (massive open online courses), which have also been modeled as Stackelberg
games [Li and Conitzer, 2017]. In these situations, the tester may need to use different exams for dif-
ferent types of exam takers who usually come from various education backgrounds and have different
learning objectives. Again, the exam design will also need to take into account the exam taker’s possible
misreport about their type to strategically conceal their strength in the hope of a preferred test.
Deception has been extensively studied in Stackelberg games, particularly in its applications in se-
curity domains [Brown et al., 2005; Powell, 2007; Zhuang and Bier, 2010; Yin et al., 2013; Xu et al.,
2015; Guo et al., 2017; Schlenker et al., 2018]. However, all previous works focus on designing decep-
tive strategies for the leader (usually, a defender). In these models, it is the leader who has the infor-
mational advantage, whereas in our model the follower has the greater decision-pertinent knowledge
and discloses it strategically. To the best of our knowledge, there has been very limited work studying
follower deception in Stackelberg games. The most relevant to ours is perhaps [Xu et al., 2016], which
studies signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg games and also considers the possibility that a follower may
strategically misreport his type. However, the question they study is completely different from ours —
they design signaling schemes for different follower types whereas we design the leader’s mixed strat-
egy for each follower type. The contrasting complexity between their model (polynomial-time solvable
for normal form games) and ours (NP-hard) also highlights the intrinsic difference. Even more impor-
tantly, though, in our model type reporting takes the conceptual form of a behaviour inducing message.
The common information asymmetry (see e.g. [Rabinovich et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015; Dughmi et al.,
2016]) is reversed between the leader and the follower.
2 A Motivating Example
We illustrate how the follower’s deceptive behavior may result in highly suboptimal leader strategy, and
how we can overcome this issue using carefully-designed leader strategies. For illustrative purpose, we
use a real-world security game example, though the underlying phenomenon also generalizes to other
applications.
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A security game is a Stackelberg game played between a defender (the leader) and an attacker (the
follower). Concretely, we consider a security agency who wants to protect two conservation areas, i.e.,
areas 1 and 2, from a poacher’s attack. The defender can only patrol one of these two areas, while the
poacher chooses one area to attack. At different periods of the year, the poacher’s payoffs change due to
price fluctuation of wildlife products on black markets. We capture this uncertainty using two possible
types of poacher payoffs, i.e., type A and B. Assume that the defender’s payoff is independent of the
poacher’s type. The poacher knows his true type, but the defender only has a prior belief that each type
shows up with probability 0.5. (This can be obtained via, e.g., surveying past prices on black markets.)
The payoff matrices of the defender (row player) and the two poacher types (column player) are shown
below.
1
x
2
x
1 1 −1
2 −1 0.99
defender
1
x
2
x
1 −1 1/3
2 3 −1
poacher type A
1
x
2
x
1 −1 1
2 1 −1
poacher type B
The only difference between these poacher types is their value for successful attacks, which is af-
fected by wildlife product prices at that time period. Standard calculation shows that if the poacher has
type A, the optimal defender strategy is (3/4, 1/4), i.e., patrolling areas 1 and 2with probability 3/4 and
1/4, respectively, resulting in poacher utility 0 at both areas. By the standard assumption, the poacher
thus breaks the tie in favor of the defender and attacks area 1,1 yielding defender utility 1/2. Similarly,
the optimal defender strategy is (1/2, 1/2) against a type-B poacher, which induces the poacher to also
attack area 1 and yields defender utility 0.
Ideally, the defender would like to play the optimal patrolling strategy against the poacher’s true type
at any time which, however, is unknown to the defender. Nevertheless, if the poacher were to behave
truthfully according to his type, the defender can easily learn the poacher’s type, e.g., by observing
their (different) best responses to strategy (3/5, 2/5). Indeed, previous approaches for learning the
optimal leader strategy rely crucially on the assumption that the follower will truthfully respond (e.g.,
[Letchford et al., 2009; Blum et al., 2014; Haghtalab et al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016]). However, in this
example, a type-A poacher has strong incentives to be untruthful: by imitating a type-B poacher and
reacting exactly according to the type-B payoff structure, a type-A poacher is able to induce the defender
to play (1/2, 1/2) — the optimal strategy against a type-B poacher — which results in true utility
1
2 · (−1) +
1
2 · (3) = 1 for the type-A poacher. This strictly improves upon his previous utility 0 of
reacting truthfully. Simple calculation shows that a type-B poacher does not benefit from deception and
will behave truthfully. As a result, the defender will not be able to distinguish type A from B under the
poacher’s strategic deception.
The issue raised above is due to the fact that the defender focuses solely on optimizing her utility
without considering the poacher’s strategic behavior. We now show how the defender can overcome this
issue by taking into account the poacher’s deception. It happens that in this example the optimal policy
for the defender is to still play (3/4, 1/4) for type A and (1/2, 1/2) for type B, but induce a type-B
poacher to break tie “against” the defender by attacking area 2.2 This slightly decreases the defender’s
1This assumption is without loss of generality. The corresponding solution concept, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium,
remains the most widely adopted solution concept in the literature of Stackelberg games (see e.g., [Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006; Tambe, 2011]). Normally, via infinitesimal strategy variations, the leader can induce the
follower to play any best response action to the leader’s benefit. For example, the defender can play ( 3
4
− ǫ,
1
4
+ ǫ) with ǫ→ 0,
so that the poacher will strictly prefer to attack area 1 while the change to the defender’s utility can be arbitrarily small. Our
empirical evaluation in Section 6 will further confirm the robustness of our solutions against the tie-breaking issue.
2This tie breaking can be induced explicitly by playing ( 1
2
+ ǫ, 1
2
− ǫ) for an infinitesimal ǫ.
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1
x
2
x
1 1 0
2 0 ǫ
leader
1
x
2
x
1 0 0.2
2 0.8 1
follower type A
1
x
2
x
1 0.2 0
2 1 0.8
follower type B
Figure 1: The price of ignoring follower deception can be huge. Let both follower types appear with probability
0.5. When deception is ignored, the leader assumes the follower reports truthfully and will play (0, 1) for type A
and (1, 0) for typeB. However, this gives a type-B follower an incentive to misreport that he has typeA, yielding
leader utility ǫ overall. Now, if the leader properly deals with follower deception and plays, instead, (1, 0) for both
types A and B, a type-B follower will have no incentive to misreport; the leader is able to obtain utility 0.5 in this
case. The ratio 0.5/ǫ is unbounded when ǫ is arbitrarily close to 0.
C D
C −1, −1 −3, 0
D 0, −3 −2, −2
1
Figure 2: Follower deception is not always bad. If the follower (column player) deceives the leader (row player)
into believing that he has utility 1, instead of −1, for the action profile (C,C) (annotated in red), the leader would
feel reassured to commit to C, resulting in utility −1 for both players.
utility against a type-B poacher (from 0 to 12 · (−1) +
1
2 · 0.99 = −0.005), but it erases the incentive
of a type-A poacher to imitate type B: if the type-A poacher imitates B to attack area 2 under defender
strategy (1/2, 1/2), his expected utility would become −1, which is worse than his utility 0 of behaving
truthfully.
Remarks (i) This example illustrates an intriguing phenomenon: when there is follower deception, it
may be undesirable to always induce tie breaking in favor of the leader, since other tie breaking strategies
may enforce more desirable follower behaviors. If the defender adopts this nuanced strategy, the poacher
will have no incentive to deceive. Thus, from the perspective of machine learning, what we are designing
can be viewed as the best strategy the leader can learn in the presence of follower deception.
(ii) One might wonder why the defender does not ignore the poacher’s deception by simply playing
a single strategy against all types of poachers, which is precisely the optimal commitment in a Bayesian
Stackelberg game. This reason is that our more sophisticated approach can achieve better defender
utility. In this example, it can be computed that the defender would play (1/2, 1/2) in the Bayesian
Stackelberg equilibrium, obtaining utility 0. However, the strategy we designed above yields defender
utility 14−
1
400 . A more formal result regarding the utility improvement will be presented in Proposition 1.
(iii) The price of ignoring follower deception can be huge. Figure 1 illustrates an example in which
the price — the ratio between the leader’s utilities when deception is ignored and when deception is
properly dealt with — is unbounded. (Payoffs are normalized to be in [0, 1] for the ratio to be meaning-
ful.) Nevertheless, perhaps counter-intuitively, follower deception is not always bad for the leader. One
example is a Stackelberg game version of the prisoner’s dilemma illustrated in Figure 2.
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3 The Model
3.1 Stackelberg Game Basics
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. A normal-form Stackelberg game is
given by two matrices uL, uF ∈ Rm×n, which are the payoff matrices of the leader (row player) and
follower (column player), respectively. We use uL(i, j) to denote a generic entry of uL, and use [m] =
{1, ...,m} to denote the set of the leader’s pure strategies (also called actions). A mixed strategy of the
leader is a probabilistic distribution over [m], denoted by a vector x ∈ ∆m = {p ≥ 0 :
∑
i∈[m] pi = 1}.
With slight abuse of notation, we denote by uL(x, j) the expected utility
∑
i∈[m] xi · u
L(i, j). Notation
for the follower is the same by changing the labels. We will sometimes write a pure strategy i in positions
where a mixed strategy is expected, in which case it represents the same strategy in its mixed strategy
form, i.e., a basis vector ei.
In a Stackelberg game, the leader moves first by committing to a mixed strategy x, and the follower
then best responds to x. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the follower’s best response is
a pure strategy with ties broken in favor of the leader if there are multiple best responses.3 Under this
assumption, the leader mixed strategy that maximizes her expected utility leads to a strong Stackelberg
equilibrium (SSE), which is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg games. Formally, denote by
BR(x) := argmaxj∈[n] u
F(x, j) the set of follower best responses to a leader strategy x; a pair of
strategies x∗ and j∗ forms an SSE if
〈x∗, j∗〉 ∈ argmax
x∈∆m,j∈BR(x) u
L(x, j).
3.2 Stackelberg Games with Imitative Follower Deception
We now describe a basic model that captures (imitative) follower deception; the reader may refer back to
our motivating example as an instantiation of this model. We consider a leader who faces a follower with
an uncertain type, which falls in a discrete set Θ. Each type θ ∈ Θ corresponds to a different follower
payoff matrix uFθ ∈ R
m×n. For ease of presentation, we will assume that the leader’s payoff does
not depend on θ, though we remark that all our results easily generalize to the case with type-dependent
leader payoffs. To model the leader’s prior knowledge regarding the follower’s type, we adopt the classic
Bayesian perspective and assume that the leader has a prior distribution π, i.e., each type θ appears with
probability πθ. Note that π,Θ and the payoff matrices are common knowledge.
We assume that the leader can commit to a policy—a “menu” that specifies a mixed strategy xθ to be
played against each follower type θ. In addition, we assume that a follower best response jθ ∈ BRθ(x
θ)
is also specified for each θ in the policy, where BRθ(x) := argmaxj u
F
θ (x, j) now denotes the best
response set of a type-θ follower against leader strategy x; hence, in the case of a tie, the follower will be
induced to play this specific response. Note that, same as in the motivating example, jθ is not necessarily
the one that maximizes the utility the leader obtains on follower type θ; rather, the leader would prefer
to induce the follower to a carefully chosen follower action that discourages follower deception to some
extent and benefits the leader’s overall utility.
After observing the leader’s policy, a follower of type θ reports a type θˆ to the leader, and the leader
then plays the mixed strategy xθˆ as specified by her policy. The follower then “best” responds to xθˆ with
jθˆ , as if his type is θˆ. Naturally, the follower will report a type that maximizes his actual expected utility,
i.e., θˆ = argmaxβ∈Θ u
F
θ (x
β , jβ), resulting in the leader to obtain utility uL(xθˆ, jθˆ). The reporting
step in our model is straightforward in various applications (see Section 1), whereas in some other
applications, reporting abstracts the process that the leader learns the follower’s type by interacting with
the follower (as in the motivating example).
3See footnote 1.
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In summary, the game proceeds as follows:
1. The leader commits to a policy σ = {oθ}θ∈Θ that prescribes, for each reported follower type
θ ∈ Θ, an outcome oθ = 〈xθ, jθ〉 such that jθ ∈ BRθ(x) := argmaxj u
F
θ (x, j).
2. After observing the leader policy σ, a follower of type θ, who appears with probability πθ, reports
a best type θˆ(σ) = argmaxβ∈Θ u
F
θ (x
β , jβ) that maximizes his actual utility; same as the standard
SSE assumption, we assume the follower breaks ties by reporting a type in favor of the leader.
This results in overall leader utility
UL(σ) :=
∑
θ∈Θ
πθ · u
L(xθˆ(σ), jθˆ(σ)).
The computational task we examine is maxσ U
L(σ). For convenience, we will also write uFθ (o) =
uFθ (x, j) and u
L(o) = uL(x, j) for an outcome o = 〈x, j〉.
Remarks Our model can be viewed as a generalization of the classic Bayesian Stackelberg game
(BSG) model where the leader’s policy is restricted to prescribe the same mixed strategy for all follower
types [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006]. Yet, our model cannot be reduced to a classic BSG, a notable
difference being that the leader’s strategy (policy) space in our model is non-convex due to the extra
component jθ in the prescribed outcomes whereas it is convex for a BSG.
3.3 Incentive Compatibility (IC)
One can impose in addition the IC constraints on σ so that reporting truthfully is a (weakly) dominant
strategy for every follower type, i.e., uFθ (x
θ, jθ) ≥ uFθ (x
β , jβ) for any β ∈ Θ. We will consider model
variants both with and without IC constraints. The following result shows that an IC policy always exists,
and even when IC constraints are imposed, our approach always achieves at least the leader utility in a
Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium. This echoes our observation in the motivating example.
Proposition 1. There always exists an IC policy, and the optimal IC policy achieves at least the leader
utility in a Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. Let x be the leader strategy in a Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium (BSE), and let jθ be the best
response of a type-θ follower in the BSE for each θ, i.e., jθ ∈ argmaxj∈BRθ(x) u
L(x, j). A policy that
prescribes oθ = 〈x, jθ〉 for each follower type θ ∈ Θ is trivially IC because by reporting truthfully the
follower will also be induced to play his true best response jθ to x. In addition, it offers the leader utility∑
θ∈Θ πθ · u
L(x, jθ)— exactly what she obtains in the BSE.
4 Computing the Optimal Policy
In this section, we study the complexity and algorithms for computing the optimal leader policy. We
will refer to the problem of computing the optimal policy OPT-POLICY and, when IC constraints are
imposed, OPT-POLICY-IC.
4.1 Hardness of Approximation
We show in Theorems 2 and 3 that it is NP-hard even just to approximate the optimal policy to within a
meaningful ratio, with or without IC constraints, and even when the follower has only a small number
of actions. The bounds in the inapproximability results are essentially tight by Theorem 4. In contrast,
there is an efficient algorithm for a small follower type set, which we show in Theorem 5 after we present
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1
F
2
F
3
F
a0 0.5 1 1
av 0.5 0.5
bv 1 1
av′ : v
′ ∈ N (v) 1 1
otherwise 0.5 1
follower type θv
1
F
2
F
3
F
any i 1
follower type θ∗
1
F
2
F
3
F
any i 1
leader
Figure 3: Payoffs matrices (proof of Theorem 2).
an MILP (mixed integer linear program)-based algorithm for the general case. Our approximation ratios
are all multiplicative; by convention, we normalize the leader’s payoff parameters to be in [0, 1] in order
for the ratios to be meaningful.
Theorem 2. For any constant ǫ > 0, OPT-POLICY does not admit any polynomial-time 1
(|Θ|−1)1−ǫ
-
approximation algorithm unless P = NP, even when the follower has only three actions.
Proof. We show a reduction from the MAX-INDEPENDENT-SET problem, which asks for the size of the
maximum independent set in a graph G = (V,E). A set of nodes V ′ ⊆ V is an independent set of G if
no edge in E connects any pair of nodes in V ′; an independent set is maximum if there exists no other
independent set with a larger size. It is known that no polynomial-time 1
|V |1−ǫ
-approximation algorithm
exists for MAX-INDEPENDENT-SET, unless P = NP [Zuckerman, 2006].
We construct a Stackelberg game with |V |+1 follower types Θ = {θ∗}∪{θv : v ∈ V }, where each
θv corresponds to node v. Let πθ∗ = 0 and πθ =
1
|Θ|−1 for all other θ. The leader has 2|V |+ 1 actions
{av : v ∈ V } ∪ {bv : v ∈ V } ∪ {a0}; and the follower has three actions {1
F, 2F, 3F}. The payoffs are
given in Figure 3, where N (v) denotes the set of neighbouring nodes of v, and all the empty entries are
0.
The following are a few observations about the game:
• For follower type θ∗, j = 1
F strictly dominates all the other actions. A follower can only be
induced to play j = 1F when θ∗ is reported, in which case the leader gets utility 1.
• For each θv, when they are reported, j = 1
F cannot be induced by any leader strategy because it
is strictly dominated by j = 2F. As a result, the leader gets 0 once θv is reported.
• Given the above, the leader’s overall utility is proportional to the number of follower types θv that
are motivated to report θ∗.
Now for any independent set V ′ of size k in G, we can construct the following leader policy σ:
oθ∗ = 〈a0, 1
F〉, oθv = 〈av, 2
F〉 if v ∈ V ′, and oθv = 〈bv, 2
F〉 if v /∈ V ′. Given this policy, all types θv,
v ∈ V ′, will find reporting θ∗ optimal, while all the others are better-off reporting truthfully. As a result,
the leader receives overall utility k|Θ|−1 .
Conversely, we claim that for any policy σ, the set of nodes v of which the corresponding types θv
are incentivized to report θ∗ form an independent set, i.e., {v ∈ V : θˆv(σ) = θ∗} is an independent set.
To see this, suppose for a contradiction that types θv and θv′ are incentivized to report θ∗ but (v, v
′) ∈ E.
By our observations above, both θv and θv′ will be induced to play 1
F and obtain utility 0.5 each. Thus,
we need the following in order for them to have no incentive to report another type.
(i) x
θv′
av′
= 0, since otherwise the fourth row of the payoff matrix of θv would be chosen with some
probability, and θv would be better-off reporting θv′ to obtain utility strictly greater than 0.5.
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1
F
2
F
3
F
av
bv 1 1
av′ : v
′ ∈ N (v) 0.5 1
otherwise 1
follower type θv
1
F
2
F
3
F
any i 1
leader
Figure 4: Payoffs matrices (proof of Theorem 3).
(ii) x
θv′
a0 = x
θv′
bv′
= 0, and x
θv′
av′′
= 0 for all v′′ ∈ N (v′), since otherwise one of the first, third and
fourth rows of the payoff matrix of θv′ would be chosen with some probability, and θv′ would be
better-off reporting truthfully to obtain utility strictly greater than 0.5.
It follows that, now xθv′ will pick the last row of the payoff matrix with probability 1, so 3F becomes
the only best response of a type-θv′ player against x
θv′ . Thus, we have oθv′ = 〈xθv′ , 3F〉, in which case,
however, θv′ is able to obtain utility 1 by reporting truthfully, which contradicts the assumption that θv′
is incentivized to report θ∗.
Therefore, the number of follower types that are motivated to report θ∗ by the optimal policy
is exactly to the size of the maximum independent set (and proportional to the overall leader util-
ity). Any 1
(|Θ|−1)1−ǫ
-approximation algorithm would also provide a 1
|V |1−ǫ
-approximation to the MAX-
INDEPENDENT-SET problem, which exists unless P = NP. This completes the proof.
Next, we show that the same inapproximability result for OPT-POLICY-IC. Our reduction will still
be from MAX-INDEPENDENT-SET but the underlying idea and the instance constructed are different:
the previous reduction maps follower types that violate IC to an independent set, which cannot be applied
when IC constraints are imposed.
Theorem 3. For any constant ǫ > 0, OPT-POLICY-IC does not admit any polynomial-time 1
|Θ|1−ǫ
-
approximation algorithm unless P = NP, even when the follower has only three actions.
Proof. We show a reduction from the MAX-INDEPENDENT-SET problem. Given an instance of MAX-
INDEPENDENT-SET specified by a graph G = (V,E), we construct a game with |V | follower types
Θ = {θv : v ∈ V }; each θv corresponds to a node v and appears with probability
1
|Θ| . The leader has
2|V | actions {av : v ∈ V } ∪ {bv : v ∈ V }; and the follower has three actions {1
F, 2F, 3F}. The payoffs
are given in Figure 4, where N (v) denotes the set of neighbouring nodes of v, and all the empty entries
are 0.
Now for any independent set V ′ of size k in G, consider a leader policy σ with: oθv = 〈av, 1
F〉 if
v ∈ V ′, and oθv = 〈bv , 2
F〉 if v /∈ V ′. In this policy, all types find truthful report to be optimal. Hence,
the policy is IC and offers the leader overall utility k|Θ| .
Conversely, for any IC policy σ, we claim that the set of nodes v of which the corresponding fol-
lower types θv are motivated to respond with j = 1
F form an independent set, i.e., {v ∈ V : oθv =
〈i, 1F〉 for some i} is an independent set. Suppose for a contradiction that θv and θv′ both respond with
j = 1F while (v, v′) ∈ E. Observe that, when θv is reported, j = 1
F can be induced only by leader
strategy av because it is strictly dominated by j = 3
F in all other cases. Thus, oθv = 〈av , 1
F〉 and
oθv′ = 〈av′ , 1
F〉, in which case both θv and θv′ obtain utility 0, so θv′ would be better-off reporting θv,
which contradicts the assumption that σ is IC.
Therefore, under the optimal IC policy, the number of follower types that respond with j = 1F
(which is proportional to the leader’s overall utility) is equal to the size of the maximum independent
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set in G. Any 1
|Θ|1−ǫ
-approximation algorithm would also provide a 1
|V |1−ǫ
-approximation to the MAX-
INDEPENDENT-SET problem.
The bounds in Theorems 2 and 3 are essentially tight as suggested by a polynomial-time approxi-
mation algorithm in the next theorem with the matching approximation ratio.
Theorem 4. Both OPT-POLICY and OPT-POLICY-IC admit a polynomial-time 1|Θ| -approximation al-
gorithm.
Proof. We show an approximation algorithm for OPT-POLICY. The algorithm for OPT-POLICY-IC
follows a similar procedure.
For each follower type θ ∈ Θ, we compute a policy σθ that maximizes the actual utility the leader
obtains on this specific type. We show that (i) σθ can be computed in polynomial time, and (ii) the best
σθ over all θ ∈ Θ achieves at least
1
|Θ| of the leader utility under the optimal policy.
(i) Polynomial-time computability. To compute σθ, the idea is to enumerate all possible reporting
strategies β ∈ Θ of type θ and, for each β, compute the best policy under the constraint that it is indeed
optimal for a type-θ follower to report β. An observation that helps simplifying the computation is that
we only need to guarantee reporting β to be (weakly) preferred by a type-θ follower to reporting θ, i.e.,
the truthful report, so it suffices to consider only the two associated outcomes in the leader’s policy, i.e.,
oθ = 〈xθ, jθ〉 and oβ = 〈xβ, jβ〉. This is due to the fact that a policy that prescribes the same strategy
x
θ for all other reports β′ /∈ {θ, β} will trivially make the truthful report (weakly) preferred to all other
reporting strategies β′ /∈ {θ, β}: by reporting truthfully, the follower will already be induced to play
his true best response to xθ . Now, the problem reduces to solving the following LP (liner program), in
which xθ and xβ are the variables, for every pair of possible values of jθ and jβ . Since jθ, jβ ∈ [n],
there are n2 LPs to be solved; the polynomial-time computability follows immediately.
maximize uL(xβ , jβ) (1)
subject to uFθ (x
θ, jθ) ≥ uFθ (x
θ, j) for j ∈ [n] (1a)
uFβ(x
β, jβ) ≥ uFβ(x
β , j) for j ∈ [n] (1b)
uFθ (x
β , jβ) ≥ uFθ (x
θ, jθ) (1c)
x
θ,xβ ∈ ∆m (1d)
Namely, we maximize the leader’s utility obtained on a type-θ follower under the condition that the
follower is incentivized to report β. Here, (1a) and (1b) guarantee that jθ ∈ BRθ(x) and j
β ∈ BRβ(x)
as required in the definition of leader policy; and (1c) ensures that reporting β is indeed a better choice
for a type-θ follower than reporting θ. The policy σθ is given by the LP with the best optimal solution
among all the n2 LPs.
(ii) Utility guarantee. It remains to show that the best σθ over all θ ∈ Θ offers the desired utility. For
each θ, let µLθ be the utility offered by σθ. We have U
L(σθ) ≥ π·µ
L
θ because π·µ
L
θ is only the part of leader
utility obtained on type θ. Now consider an arbitrary feasible policy ς =
{
〈zθ, kθ〉
}
θ∈Θ
. Let θˆ(ς) denote
a type-θ follower’s best reporting strategy in response to policy ς . It holds that µLθ ≥ u
L(zθˆ(ς), kθˆ(ς))
because xθ = zθ and xβ = zθˆ(ς) are feasible under (1a)–(1d) when jθ and jβ are set to kθ and kθˆ(ς),
respectively. Let θ∗ = argmaxθ∈Θ πθ · µ
L
θ . It follows that, for any feasible σ,
UL(σθ∗) ≥ πθ∗ · µ
L
θ∗ ≥
1
|Θ|
∑
θ
πθ · µ
L
θ ≥
1
|Θ|
∑
θ
πθ · u
L(xθˆ(ς), jθˆ(ς)) =
1
|Θ|
· UL(ς).
Since the choice of ς is arbitrary, σθ∗ serves as an
1
|Θ| -approximation of the optimal policy.
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4.2 An MILP Formulation and the Tractability with Small Θ
Given the hardness result, efficient algorithms for computing the optimal policy seems unlikely. We
provide an algorithm based on an MILP as a practical approach to tackle the problem. The MILP
formulation also forms the basis of a polynomial-time algorithm for OPT-POLICY and OPT-POLICY-IC
when the size of the follower type set Θ is fixed.
First, when IC constraints are not imposed, the following program (not linear yet) computes the
optimal leader policy, where µLθ , x
θ, yθβ, and p
θ
j are the variables (θ, β ∈ Θ, and j ∈ [n]).
maximize
∑
θ πθ · µ
L
θ (2)
subject to µLθ ≤
∑
j p
β
j · u
L(xβ, j) + (1− yθβ) ·M for θ, β ∈ Θ (2a)
pθj ·
[
uFθ (x
θ, j) − uFθ (x
θ, k)
]
≥ 0 for θ ∈ Θ; j, k ∈ [n] (2b)
∑
j p
β
j · u
F
θ (x
β , j) −
∑
j p
γ
j · u
F
θ (x
γ , j) ≥ −(1− yθβ) ·M for θ, β, γ ∈ Θ (2c)∑
i x
θ
i =
∑
j p
θ
j =
∑
β y
θ
β = 1 for θ ∈ Θ (2d)
x
θ ∈ [0, 1]m, yθβ ∈ {0, 1}, p
θ
j ∈ {0, 1} for θ, β ∈ Θ; j ∈ [n] (2e)
Here, the leader policy is represented by variables xθ and pθj , where x
θ is the leader mixed strategy
prescribed for report θ, and pθj ∈ {0, 1} captures the induced follower action. Through (2b), it is
guaranteed that pθj = 1 only if j is a best response of type θ to x
θ, and pθj = 0, otherwise. Similarly,
yθβ captures the optimal reporting strategy of type θ, i.e., y
θ
β = 1 only if reporting β is optimal for θ,
and this is guaranteed by (2c), in whichM is a sufficiently large constant. Finally, each µLθ captures the
utility the leader obtains from true type θ by (2a).
This program is not yet an MILP because of the quadratic terms pθj · x
θ. To linearize the program,
we replace these terms with a set of new variables x˜θji, subject to 0 ≤ x˜
θ
ji ≤ x
θ
i (for all θ ∈ Θ, j ∈ [n],
and i ∈ [m]) and
∑
i x˜
θ
ji = p
θ
j (for all θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ [m]). This guarantees x˜
θ
ji = p
θ
j · x
θ
i given that p
θ
j
is restricted to be in {0, 1}.
In the situation with IC constraints, we force yθθ = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ in the above MILP. The “windfall”
of the MILP formulation is Theorem 5, the tractability of OPT-POLICY and OPT-POLICY-IC with a
small Θ.
Theorem 5. For a fixed number of follower types, both OPT-POLICY and OPT-POLICY-IC can be
solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Following Program (2), when |Θ| is a constant, the size of the joint space of feasible y and p is
bounded by a polynomial in n. We can enumerate every combination in this space and solve Program (2)
with y and p fixed to values in the combination; the program becomes a linear program as the remaining
variables are continuous.
5 Generalization to Mixed Policy
The leader policy we have considered so far consists of a single outcome 〈xθ, jθ〉 for each θ. In this
section, we extend the definition of leader policy, and allow a policy to prescribed a distribution of
outcomes for each follower type. We call an outcome distribution a mixture and refer to a leader policy
consisting of mixtures a mixed policy, as opposed to pure policies in the previous sections.
Now the game proceeds as follows. The leader first commits to a mixed policy. The follower
observes the mixed policy and reports a type θ. The leader then samples an outcome 〈x, j〉 from the
mixture prescribed for θ, plays x, and induces the follower to respond with action j.
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Obviously, the leader utility of an optimal mixed policy is at least that of a pure one as all pure
policies are also mixed policies by definition. An immediate question is why further randomization over
the outcomes will benefit the leader since the leader is already playing a mixed strategy in every outcome,
and randomizing mixed strategies normally will not bring any extra power for a player. It turns out that
this extra randomization will be beneficial for the leader when there is follower deception. Intuitively,
such randomization can help us tame the incentive constraints for the follower’s type reporting, while
the randomization in mixed strategies is responsible for inducing desired follower action responses. The
following example provides a more concrete illustration.
Example: Strict Improvement of Mixed Policies We consider again a security game example with
two targets: areas 1 and 2. The defender can patrol one of these areas and the poacher chooses one to
attack. The poacher has three types θ∗, θA and θB which appear with the equal probability 1/3. The
payoffs matrices are given in the tables below.
1
x
2
x
1 1 −1
2 −1 1
defender
1
x
2
x
1 −1 1
2 1 −1
poacher type θ∗
1
x
2
x
1 0 0
2 1 −2
poacher type θA
1
x
2
x
1 −2 1
2 0 0
poacher type θB
Note that the two areas are of equal value to both the defender and poacher type θ∗. Thus, θ∗ will
always attack the less frequently patrolled area, so for an outcome 〈x, j〉 prescribed for report θ∗, it
always holds that xj ≤ 1/2. Suppose without loss of generality that j = 1
x. Then type θA is able to
obtain at least 1/2 by reporting θ∗, in which case the actual utility the defender obtains on poacher type
θA, using a pure policy, cannot be more than 0, because for a type-A poacher to obtain utility at least
1/2, the bottom left entries of the payoff matrices need to be chosen with probability at least 1/2. The
same argument applies to type θB if we suppose j = 2
x. As a result, any pure policy can obtain utility
more than 0 on at most one of θA and θB. Further, observe that the true payoff parameters of type θ∗
make the game zero-sum. Thus, the actual utility the defender obtains on poacher type θ∗ is at most
0 because a type-θ∗ poacher is guaranteed utility 0 by reporting truthfully, and when playing against a
type-θ∗ poacher, the defender always gets the negative of the poacher’s actual utility. As a result, a pure
policy obtains positive utility on at most one poacher type; her overall utility is at most 1/3.
Now we consider a mixed policy as follows:
• If type θ∗ is reported, choose outcomes 〈(1/2, 1/2), 1
x〉 and 〈(1/2, 1/2), 2x〉, each with probability
1/2;
• If type θA is reported, choose outcome 〈(1, 0), 1
x〉with probability 1; and if θB , choose 〈(0, 1), 2
x〉
with probability 1.
As such, types θA and θB can only obtain −1/2 in expectation if they report θ∗. This incentivizes both
of them to report truthfully, yielding expected defender utility 2/3 — an improvement of at least 1/3
compared to the optimal pure policy.
5.1 Mixtures with Support Size n Suffice
To compute the optimal mixed policy, one challenge is that a mixture may be supported on an infinite
set since there are infinitely many mixed strategies and hence, as many outcomes. Fortunately, using a
revelation-principle-type argument, we prove that it suffices to consider mixtures supported on at most
n outcomes; each outcome induces the follower to choose a distinct action in [n]. This is shown in
Proposition 6 below.
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Proposition 6. For any feasible mixture φ prescribed for a reported type θ ∈ Θ, there is a feasible
mixture with support size n˜ ≤ n that yields the same utility as does φ, for both the leader and the
follower.
Proof. We will show that for any given mixture φ prescribed for report θ we can merge outcomes that
induce the same follower response into one outcome, and this will not change both players’ expected
utility.
Formally, let O be the support set of φ; let p〈x,j〉 > 0 be the probability assigned to outcome
〈x, j〉 ∈ O. For each j ∈ [n], let Oj = {〈x, j
′〉 ∈ O : j′ = j} be the set of outcomes that induce
follower action j. Let p˜j =
∑
〈x,j〉∈Oj
p〈x,j〉 and x˜j =
1
p˜j
∑
〈x,j〉∈Oj
p〈x,j〉 · x. Let φ˜ be a mixture
supported on {〈x˜1, 1〉, . . . , 〈x˜n, n〉}, with probability p˜j for each 〈x˜j , j〉. This new mixture will not
change the leader’s utility when θ is reported because of the following:
∑
〈x,j〉∈O
p〈x,j〉 · u
L(x, j) =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
〈x,j〉∈Oj
p〈x,j〉 · u
L(x, j)
=
∑
j∈[n]
p˜j · u
L
( 1
p˜j
∑
〈x,j〉∈Oj
p〈x,j〉 · x , j
)
=
∑
j∈[n]
p˜j · u
L(x˜j , j).
By changing labels of the utility function, we can obtain
∑
〈x,j〉∈O p〈x,j〉 · u
F
β(x, j) =
∑
j∈[n] p˜j ·
uFβ(x˜j , j) for any follower type β ∈ Θ, so φ˜ will not change the follower’s utility, either, irrespec-
tive of his true type.
It remains to show that φ˜ is indeed a valid mixture. Clearly, p˜j ≥ 0 and
∑
j p˜j =
∑
j
∑
〈x,j〉∈Oj
p〈x,j〉 =∑
〈x,j〉∈O p〈x,j〉 = 1, so p˜j is a valid probability distribution. In addition, we need each outcome 〈x˜j , j〉
to be feasible, i.e., j ∈ BRθ(x˜j), so that j can indeed be induced by x˜j . This is true because the set
Xj = {x ∈ ∆m : j ∈ BRθ(x)} = {x ∈ ∆m : u
F
θ (x, j) ≥ u
F
θ (x, j
′) for all j′ ∈ [n]} is a convex set,
and by definition, all x such that 〈x, j〉 ∈ Oj are in Xj . Thus, x˜, as a convex combination of x ∈ Xj ,
also lies in Xj , so j ∈ BRθ(x˜j). Therefore, 〈x˜j , j〉 is a feasible outcome and φ˜ a valid mixture. This
completes the proof.
Following this result, we can represent the mixture for each type θ as a vector (pθ1, . . . , p
θ
n) ∈ ∆n,
along with a support set {xθ1, . . . ,x
θ
n} of n mixed strategies; the mixture samples each outcome 〈x
θ
j , j〉
with probability pθj . Note that this representation allows outcomes involved to be invalid because it is
possible that some follower action j cannot be induced by any leader strategy, i.e., j /∈ BRθ(x) for all
x ∈ ∆m. Thus, a mixture is valid only if j ∈ BRθ(x
θ
j) for all j such that p
θ
j > 0.
5.2 Computing the Optimal Mixed Policy
Proposition 6 implies that there exists an optimal mixed policy of polynomial size. Nevertheless, out
next theorem, Theorem 7, shows that the problem of computing the optimal mixed policy, referred to
as OPT-XPOLICY , remains inapproximable in the situation without IC constraints. Interestingly, after
we impose IC constraints, the problem OPT-XPOLICY-IC becomes tractable. We present these results
next.
Theorem 7. For any constant ǫ > 0, OPT-XPOLICY does not admit any polynomial-time 1
(|Θ|−1)1−ǫ
-
approximate algorithm unless P = NP, even when the follower has only three actions.
Proof. We show a reduction from the same MAX-INDEPENDENT-SET problem as in the proof of The-
orem 2, but we will need to adapt the correctness proof to mixed policies here.
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For one direction of the reduction, if there is an independent set V ′ of size k in G, the same policy
we constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 achieves overall leader utility k|Θ|−1 for the same argument.
For the other direction, observe that it holds still with mixed policies that the leader gets 1 when θ∗
is reported, and 0, otherwise; hence, the leader’s overall utility is proportional to the number of types θv,
v ∈ V , who report θ∗. We show that, for any mixed policy σ, {v ∈ V : θˆv(σ) = θ∗} is an independent
set to conclude the proof. Suppose for a contradiction that θˆv(σ) = θ∗ and θˆv′(σ) = θ∗ but (v, v
′) ∈ E.
We make the following observations:
(i) pθv
1x
= 0 because 1x is strictly dominated by 2x for a follower of type θv and hence 1
x /∈ BRθv(x)
for any leader strategy x. It follows that we need pθv
2x
> 0 or pθv
3x
> 0, as (pθv
1x
, pθv
2x
, pθv
3x
) ∈ ∆3.
(ii) Since a follower of type θv′ gets utility 0.5 by reporting θ∗, we need p
θv
2x
· xθv
2x,av
= 0 and pθv
3x
·
xθv
3x,av
= 0 as otherwise the action profile 〈av , 2
x〉 would be chosen with some probability and θv′
would be better-off reporting θv to get more than 0.5.
Now, consider the two possible cases implied by (i).
• If pθv
3x
> 0, we then have xθv
3x,av
= 0 by (ii), which means some action profile 〈i, 3x〉, i 6= av,
would be chosen with some probability, in which case a follower of type θv would be better-off
reporting truthfully instead of reporting θ∗ — a contradiction.
• If pθv
2x
> 0, we have xθv
2x,av
= 0 by (ii). Now in order for a type-θv follower to still find reporting
θ∗ optimal, we need x
θv
2x,i = 0 for all i ∈ {a0, bv} ∪ N (v) (correspondingly, the first, third
and fourth rows of the payoff matrix) as otherwise truthful report would gain type θv a higher
utility; consequently, only the fifth row of the payoff matrix will be chosen by xθv
2x
, in which case,
however, BRθv(x
θv
2x
) = {3x}, so 〈xθv
2x
, 2x〉 cannot be a valid outcome — a contradiction to the
assumption that pθv
2x
> 0.
This completes the proof.
The bound in the above inapproximability result is tight following a similar argument for OPT-POLICY.
Moreover, an MILP formulation for OPT-XPOLICY can be obtained by modifying Program (2), and this
yields a polynomial-time algorithm for OPT-XPOLICY when the number of follower types is fixed. If we
further impose IC constraints, the constraints remove the only integer variables yθβ in the MILP (variables
pθj are relaxed now) and result in a linear program; this establishes the tractability of OPT-XPOLICY-IC.
We sketch the results in Theorems 8–10 below.
Theorem 8. OPT-XPOLICY admits a polynomial-time 1|Θ| -approximation algorithm.
Proof Sketch. The proof follows from a similar argument for Theorem 4.
Theorem 9. For a fixed number of follower types, OPT-XPOLICY can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof Sketch. We modify Program (2) for a formulation for OPT-XPOLICY: replace every xθ by xθj
wherever they are associated with pθj ; and relax every p
θ
j to be in [0, 1]. The modified program can
be linearized into an MILP in the same way we linearize Program (2). By the same argument for
Theorem 9, the MILP formulation yields a polynomial-time algorithm for OPT-XPOLICY when the
number of follower types is fixed.
Theorem 10. OPT-XPOLICY-IC can be computed in polynomial time.
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Proof Sketch. The problem can be formulated as a linear program as follows, where x˜θj and p
θ
j are the
variables (j ∈ [n], θ ∈ Θ).
maximize
∑
θ πθ
∑
j u
L(x˜θj , j)
subject to
∑
j u
F
θ (x˜
θ
j , j) −
∑
j u
F
θ (x˜
β
j , j) ≥ 0 for θ, β ∈ Θ
uFθ (x˜
θ
j , j) − u
F
θ (x˜
θ
j , k) ≥ 0 for θ ∈ Θ; j, k ∈ [n]∑
i x˜
θ
ji = p
θ
j for θ ∈ Θ; j ∈ [n]
x˜
θ
j ∈ R
m
≥0, (p
θ
1, . . . , p
θ
n) ∈ ∆n for θ, β ∈ Θ; j ∈ [n]
The strategies xθj in the leader policy can be extracted from the solution as x
θ
j =
1
pθj
· x˜θj .
6 Empirical Evaluation
We evaluate our framework with games generated randomly using the well-known covariance game
model [Nudelman et al., 2004]. We generate the players’ payoffs uniformly at random from the range
[0, 1], and then adjust the follower’s payoffs by blending them with the negative value of the leader’s
payoffs; the degree of blending is controlled by a parameter α ∈ [0, 1], i.e., uFθ ← (1− α) · u
F
θ − α · u
L.
As such, the game is zero-sum when α = 1; and, when α = 0, payoffs of the leader and the follower are
completely uncorrelated. We also generate the probabilities πθ’s uniformly at random.
We compare the leader’s utility obtained by different policies/approaches proposed in this paper and
previous research, including: (1) Optimal pure policy (labeled Opt), with and without IC; (2) Optimal
mixed policy (OptX), with and without IC; (3) Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibrium (BSE); (4) Optimal
leader strategy when the follower truthfully reports his type (Truthful), and (5) the same strategy but
when the follower strategically reports his type (Deceitful).
Figure 5 depicts our results. The first three figures, (a)–(c), show the variance of leader utility with
α under different numbers of player actions. For ease of comparison, the results are depicted as ratios
to the leader utility in the truthful situation. The figures exhibit quite similar patterns. All our proposed
polices (lines in blue) improve the leader’s utility significantly upon BSE. The utilities obtained are
also very close to the truthful utility even when IC constraints are imposed. When IC is not required,
the optimal policies even perform better in almost all experiments. Surprisingly, even when the leader
naı¨vely trusts a deceitful follower, the results are very positive; the utility obtained is usually very close
to the truthful utility. This is in contrast to our theoretical examples. An explanation is that in randomly
generated games, the negative effect of follower deception is likely to be cancelled out by positive effect
brought by benign follower types: as we have observed in Section 3, follower deception is not always
bad for the leader.
The utility differences are the most significant when α is around 0.5. Intuitively, this is because
when α approaches 1 the diminishing uncertainty over follower types reduces the effect of follower
deception. But when α is close to 0, payoffs of the leader and the follower are less correlated and their
objectives less conflicted; hence, when the follower leverages deception to increase his utility, there is a
lower chance that this will decrease the leader’s utility.
We further investigate the effects of varying numbers of actions and of follower types. From Fig-
ure 5 (d) we see that utility differences (except for BSE) quickly diminish when the number of actions
increase. Similar to the situation when α is close to 0, the level of randomness of the payoffs increases as
the action space grows, which dissolves the negative effect of follower deception. In contrast, as shown
in Figure 5 (e), the effect of follower deception appear to increase with the number of follower types
as leader utility in the deceitful setting drops. Utility offered by the optimal mixed IC policy, however,
decreases much slower. Hence, the optimal mixed IC policy offers a scalable practical solution when
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Figure 5: Leader utility obtained with different approaches. All y-axes represent leader utility as a ratio to the
utility obtained in the truthful situation. The missing data points are instances that are not able to be solved within
one hour in our platform because of the scalability issue. All results are the average of 50 runs.
there is a large number of follower types. At a high level, these results suggest that uncertainty over
follower’s payoff information is a major amplifier of the negative effect of follower deception.
To explore situations in which follower deception is likely to be more harmful, we slightly modify
the covariance game model, generating the follower type set with multiple blending parameters. In
Figure 5 (f), the results are obtained on a follower type set in which half of the types are generated with
α = 0.5, and another half generated with α′ as on the x-axis. Interestingly, the difference between the
approaches suddenly becomes more distinguishable, and there is a clear gap between the optimal and
the deceptive situations. An in-depth characterization of when deception tends to be more harmful to
the leader and when it is not would be an interesting question for future work.
Robustness to Tie-breaking In our model, we assumed that the follower will break ties in favor of the
leader. The assumption is already widely adopted in the literature of Stackelberg games because such fa-
vorable tie-breaking behavior can typically be induced by an infinitesimal deviation of the leader’s strat-
egy, though in some rare and extreme cases such inducibility may not hold true (see a recent discussion
in [Guo et al., 2018]). Our next set of simulation results experimentally demonstrate that inducibility
is not an issue in our model for naturally generated instances. In the simulations, we enforce a small
utility gap of at least ǫ for the follower between taking the induced action and any other action (the same
with the induced reporting strategy). This removes all the ties, and makes the follower strictly prefer the
action (by ǫ) the leader intends to induce. The results are depicted in Table 1, with ǫ varying from 10−5
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10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
Opt 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.63
Opt (IC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.61∗
OptX 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.66
OptX (IC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.67
OptX (IC) - large 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.79
Table 1: Leader utility yielded by robust solutions as a ratio to the utility under the optimistic tie-breaking as-
sumption, with ǫ varying from 10−5 to 10−1. Results of OptX (IC) - large are obtained on large instances with
α = 0.5, |Θ| = 50, n = m = 20; all other results are obtained on instances with α = 0.5, |Θ| = 5, n = 5 and
m = 10. Each entry is the average of 100 runs. (∗) In 9 out of 100 runs of this setting there is no feasible solution.
to 10−1. The experimental results show that our solution is robust to tie breaking and always maintains
optimality for ǫ ≤ 10−3 (recall that the follower’s payoffs are in [−1, 1]). Moreover, desired follower
actions are almost always inducible only except for a small number of instances when ǫ = 0.1.4 These
results empirically show that the issue of tie-breaking does not affect the validity of our approach in
natural instances.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we point out potential occurrences of (imitative) follower deception in Stackelberg games
and the risk when they are ignored. We then propose a framework to design leader policies against such
deception and provide a systematic study of the computational aspects of this framework. Our results
shows that handling follower deception is hard in general, even when the searching of optimal policy is
expanded into the less complicated space of mixed policies. Our experiments indicate that the loss due
to ignoring follower deception grows with uncertainty over follower types. However, when there is only
a small number of types, the average loss appear to be very small compared to results in the theoretical
analysis.
There are a number of potential directions for future work. Perhaps the first ones to investigate
are several extended settings, including the setting with no prior knowledge about the distribution of
follower types, and the setting where follower types fall into a continuous space (e.g., when each payoff
parameter falls in an interval) instead of a finite set as in our current model. For the former, the worst-case
analysis might be relevant, and an even more challenge task arises when the leader is also trying to learn
the prior distribution of follower types from the interaction. For the latter, even the follower’s problem
of how to optimally misreport his type does not appear to have an obvious solution, unlike in our current
model (where the follower simply needs to enumerate all types in the finite type set). Another natural
setting is that the follower does not need to keep imitating the fake type, switching back to playing their
actual best response after the leader finishes learning. This is yet another generalization of the standard
Bayesian Stackelberg game model, and the preliminary thought is that the same policy-based approach
is also able to guarantee the leader as least her utility in the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium (similar
to our Proposition 1).
Besides focusing on normal-form Stackelberg game models, it would also be interesting to position
this work in a specific application area, such as security games where follower deception might be more
common, yet more harmful, because of the adversarial nature of the game.
4Note that we list ǫ = 0.1 only for illustrative purpose as in practice one would never want to use such a big ǫ to induce tie
breaking. There are extended approaches able to generate feasible robust solutions for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1] (see [Pita et al., 2010]),
but this is not the focus of this paper.
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